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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the district court's interpretation ofldaho Code § 63-602W(4) to 
Jayo Development, Inc.' s 2012 applications for property tax exemption for site improvements 
on its forty-one ( 41) parcels. The district court, on summary judgment, affirmed the Ada County 
Board of Equalization's denial of the exemption on all of the Parcels. The district court read the 
plain language of the statute, in particular use of the definite article, "the," to refer to the land 
developer who makes the site improvements. Jayo Development, Inc. was not the land 
developer but was a successor corporation to Jayo Construction, Inc., which made the site 
improvements. As an alternative basis for its affirmance of the denial, the district court applied 
Idaho State Tax Commission Rule 620 to hold that the site improvements exemption in this case 
could only accrue to Jayo Construction, Inc., and would have been lost when Jayo Construction, 
Inc. conveyed away title to the parcels. 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
Appellant's recitation of the Course of Proceedings is accurate and complete for purposes 
of the appeal. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The parcel owner that made all of the site improvements in 2008 on the forty-one ( 41) 
parcels that are the subject of this appeal was Jayo Construction, Inc. R., p. 017. The parcel 
owner that claimed the 2012 site improvements exemption on the forty-one ( 41) parcels was 
Jayo Development, Inc., R. p. 016, which had acquired the parcels as a result of conveyances 
from Jayo Construction, Inc., Jayo Construction LLC, and Doug Jayo. R., pp. 017-020. 
The relevant exemption statute reads as follows: 
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63-602W. Business inventory exempt from taxation - Business inventory 
that is a component of real property that is a single family dwelling. - The 
following property is exempt from property taxation: business inventory. For the 
purpose of this section, "business inventory" means all items of personal property 
or other property described as: 
**** 
(4) Site improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads and 
utilities, on real property held by the land developer for sale or consumption in the 
ordinary course of the land developer's business until other improvements such as 
buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or title to the land is 
conveyed from the land developer. 
Idaho Code § 63-602W(4) (2012). The statute was amended in 2013. The Amendment was 
declared an emergency and made retroactive to January 1, 2013. 
The original denial of the exemption by the Ada County Assessor in May of 2012 relied 
in part on Rule 620 and on the conveyance made after installation of the site improvements by 
Jayo Construction, Inc. Agency Record. The Ada County Board of Equalization ("BOE"), on 
appeal, did not alter the decision denying the exemption. Agency Record. The Board of Tax 
Appeals, which affirmed the BOE, concluded that "While appellant may be a land developer in 
the common sense of the term, Appellant is not the type of land developer referenced in the 
statute." Agency Record. 
Pursuant to the district court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, the district 
court entered its Judgment on September 12, 2013. R., p. 136-137. In the Order, the district 
court found that the statute was not ambiguous and concluded that the Legislature's choice of 
"the land developer" was intended to refer to the land developer that installed the site 
improvements on the various parcels. R., p. 129. Alternatively, the district court concluded that 
even if the statute were deemed ambiguous, under Rule 620 of the Idaho State Tax Commission 
Rules, the exemption could only accrue to Jayo Construction, Inc. and would have been lost 
when Jayo Construction, Inc. conveyed away title to the parcels. R., p. 132. 
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II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review by the Supreme Court of a district court's ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment is the same as that required of the district court when ruling on the motion. Friel v. 
Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 887 P.2d 29 (1994). If the evidence reveals no disputed 
issues of material fact, what remains is a question of law, over which this court exercises free 
review. Id. Because both parties moved for summary judgment based on the same stipulated 
facts and on the same theories and issues, they effectively stipulated that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact. Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 716 P.2d 1321 (1986). 
The appellate court exercises free review over the application and construction of 
statutes. State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120, 294 P.3d 1132 (2012), citing State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 
502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). The interpretation of a statutory provision must 
begin with the literal words of the statute, giving the language its plain, obvious and rational 
meaning. Crawford v. Dep't of Correction, 133 Idaho 633, 991 P.2d 358 (1999). When 
interpreting the meaning of statutory language, the Court is to give effect to the legislative intent 
and the purpose of the statute. Id., citing Allen v. Blaine, 131 Idaho 138, 953 P.2d 578 (1997). 
The legislature's intent in enacting a statute may be implied from the language used or inferred 
on grounds of policy or reasonableness. Id., quoting Black v. Reynolds, 109 Idaho 277, 280, 707 
P.2d 338, 391 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Stewart v. Rice, 120 Idaho 504, 817 P.2d 
170 (1991). 
Statutes granting tax exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor 
of the state. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc y v. Bd. of Equalization, 119 Idaho 126, 
804 P .2d 299 ( 1990). The burden is on the taxpayer to clearly establish a right of exemption, and 
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the exemption cannot be sustained unless it is within the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Id. 
The courts are bound by the statute and cannot create or extend by judicial construction an 
exemption not specifically authorized. Id. 
III. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in affirming the denial of the site improvements 
exemption ofldaho Code§ 63-602W(4) for the 2012 tax year to Jayo Development, Inc. 
2. Whether the 2013 amendment to Idaho Code § 63-602W(4) is relevant to 
determining the legislative intent of the 2012 exemption statute. 
3. Whether Ada County Board of Equalization is entitled to attorney fees on appeal 




The primary issue on appeal is whether the district court's interpretation of Idaho Code 
§ 63-602W(4) was in error. Appellant argues that the district court went beyond the words of the 
statute, which it was precluded from doing once it found the statute to be unambiguous. 
Appellant also argues, whether interpreting the unambiguous language of the statute or analyzing 
the statute as ambiguous where the court looked to Rule 620, the district court should have been 
guided by the "clarifying" 2013 amendment and should not have relied on Rule 620 that had 
been allowed to expire by the time of the district court's rulings. 
A. "The land developer" in the statute is the one who made the site 
improvements. 
Examining the words of the statute, the district court concluded: 
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Had the legislature intended the exemption to apply to all land developers holding 
property with site improvements, irrespective of whether that developer made the site 
improvements, it would have used the term "a land developer" in the statute. However, 
the legislature's use of the term "the land developer" connotes its intent to grant the 
exemption to a single entity - the land developer that makes the site improvements." 
R., p. 129. Despite the lack of a definition of "the land developer" in the statute, the court did 
not infer or imply into the statute language (the land developer who made the site 
improvements) that is not apparent on the face of the statute. Rather, the court engaged in a 
grammatical analysis with respect to the legislature's choice of the definite article "the," which 
is limiting or specifying; referring to a specific or previously identified person, thing, etc. See 
Webster's New World Dictionary 362 (3d ed. 1988). The specific entity entitled to the 
exemption, therefore, is deemed to be the land developer that makes the site improvements. 
A court is to construe a statute in light of the purpose and intent of the legislature in 
enacting the statute: 
In construing a statute, it is the duty of this court to ascertain the legislative intent, 
and give effect thereto. In ascertaining intent, not only must the literal wording of 
the statute be examined, but also account must be taken of other matters, "such as 
the context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times 
and the legislation upon the same subject, public policy, contemporaneous 
construction, and the like." 
Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29,382 P.2d 913,916 (1963). The Statement of Purpose to 
the bill that became the 2012 amendment ofldaho Code§ 63-602W, which added section (4) site 
improvements, seems to explain the legislative intent. It reads in relevant part, 
In the proposed bill, that portion of value created by the site improvements in the 
course of a land developer's business is exempt from property tax until a building 
begins or the title is conveyed from the land developer. 
Accordingly, it is the creation of the site improvements that enhances the value of the raw land, 
and it is the value associated with the installation of the site improvements that is temporarily 
exempted. The benefit of the statute which is to reduce the tax obligation then, is to the 
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developer who installs the site improvements, until sueh time as title is conveyed. The 
exemption was not made available to any land developer holding property containing site 
improvements, such that, as the district eourt found, "[t]he exemption did not run with the land to 
the Petitioner [Jayo Development, Inc.]" R. p. 0129. 
Had Jayo Construction, Inc., which constructed the site improvements, been holding the 
property containing the site improvements when the statute was enacted in 2012, Jayo 
Construction, Inc. likely would have applied for and been granted the exemption. However, 
transfer of title from Jayo Construction, Inc. into other entities including Jayo Development, Inc., 
for whatever purposes, had the unintended consequence of losing the site improvements 
exemption made available by Idaho Code § 63-602W( 4). 
Indeed, the statute in the first instance describes the entitlement to the exemption and 
secondly, how it is lost when, for example, the land is conveyed. The statute is concerned with 
the conveyance not with who becomes the new title holder or the relationship between the 
transferor and the transferee. In the event any land developer holding the site improvements is 
entitled to the exemption until the property is sold, then when does the value of the site 
improvements ever become taxable? 
To read the statute as urged by Appellant would be not only unreasonable but would 
significantly enlarge the scope of the exemption. Interestingly, a review of the Minutes from the 
Senate Local Government and Taxation Committee of March 19, 2013, see Exhibit E of Affidavit 
of Michael R. Jones, R., p. 064, underscores this point: 
Chairman Siddoway asked about the transfer of ownership. He said it seemed 
that last year one of the big selling points of the bill was when the land, regardless 
of what "stage" it was in, was transferred to another entity, it would lose the 
exemption. He said now it appears that has gone by the wayside. Mr. Wills said 
Chairman Siddoway is correct about last year. He said the language says "title to 
the land is conveyed from the land developer." Mr. Wills explained the developer 
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is the company that develops the land, invests the money and is able to carry it as 
business inventory ... 
Therefore, the district court was correct in its interpretation of "the land developer" as the land 
developer who made the site improvements so as to affirm the denial of the exemption to Jayo 
Development, Inc. In so ruling, the district court did not read language into the statute 
B. The District Court's Reliance of Rule 620 was not only authorized but well-
reasoned. 
The only challenge Appellant asserts with regard to the district court's alternative basis 
for affirming the denial of the exemption relates to the district court's reliance on Rule 620, 
which was no longer in effect when the district court decided the case. 
State Tax Commission Rule 620, see Idaho Admin. Code R. 35.01.03.620 (2012), was 
adopted to aid in the implementation of the newly enacted Idaho Code§ 63-602W(4). Rule 620 
was in place in 2012 and was the applicable law in effect when the Ada County Board of 
Equalization denied Jayo Development Inc.'s tax exemption applications. Rule 620, however, 
was allowed to expire by operation of law, as temporary agency rules expire at "the conclusion 
of the next succeeding regular session of the legislature unless the rule is approved, amended or 
modified by concurrent resolution .... " Idaho Code§ 67-5226(3). 
A statute or regulation that is amended or enacted between the initial and the appellate 
decision is only to be applied by an appellate court if there is clear legislative intent to that effect. 
See Atencio v. Joint Jerome Sch. Dist. #261, 837 F. Supp.2d 1158, 1163-64 (D. Idaho 2011) 
(holding that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 did not apply retroactively, in part, "because of 
the absence of congressional intent to give the amendments retroactive effect") ( citations 
omitted). Appellant has not cited any case law holding that appellate courts are to take into 
account the expiration of an administrative regulation when making a decision on appeal. 
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Moreover, Appellant has failed to cite any expression of legislative intent indicating that the 
Idaho Legislature intended for the expiration of Rule 620 to have any retroactive effect on 
decisions regarding exemptions for tax year 2012. Appellant's argument, which was rejected by 
the district court should also be rejected by this Court. In Rule 620, the Tax Commission 
construed the statute to mean that the developer applying for the exemption must have "made or 
caused to be made the site improvements on the land ... " Idaho Admin. Code R. 
35.01.03.620.03.c. The district court duly relied on Rule 620 to conclude that "the land 
developer" in the statute was the land developer that made the site improvements. The district 
court's review of the statute as ambiguous was not in error. 
The burden is on the taxpayer to clearly establish a right of exemption, and the exemption 
cannot be sustained unless it is within the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Evangelical 
Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y v. Bd. of Equalization, 119 Idaho 126, 804 P.2d 299 (1990). 
Appellant did not meet its burden, and the district court properly affirmed the denial of the 
exemption. The holding of the district court should also be affirmed. 
II. 
Appellant contends the 2013 amendments were "clarifying" amendments, which 
therefore entitle Appellant to retroactive application of the amendments. In support of its 
contention, Appellant relies on Committee Minutes containing various statements which purport 
to explain the purpose and intent of the amendments. 
A. 2013 Amendments and Legislative Reasoning Behind Them are Inapplicable. 
In enacting amendments to existing statutes, the legislature is presumed to have intended 
a meaning different from that accorded it before the amendment. State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120, 
123,294 P.3d 1132, 1135 (2012), citing Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 721, 
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682 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1984). Appellant, however, cites Reed for the proposition that when the 
legislature has acted to clarify ambiguous 1 language in a statute, then that clarifying language 
should be consulted by the Court to determine the legislature's original intent in enacting the 
original statute. The question for the Court, then, is whether the presumption is successfully 
rebutted by Appellant's claim that the 2013 amendments are a legislative clarification. 
The 2013 amendments to Idaho Code § 63-602W(4) added qualifiers to "the land 
developer" and changed the last phrase of the original statute that read "or title to the land is 
conveyed from the land developer," as shown by the italicized language: 
Site improvements that are associated with land, such as roads and utilities, on real 
property held by the land developer, either as owner or vendee in possession under 
a land sale contract, for sale or consumption in the ordinary course of the land 
developer's business until other improvements, such as buildings or structural 
components of buildings are begun or the real property is conveyed to a third 
party. 
2013 Idaho Sess. Laws 715. The amended statute also included the following additional 
language: 
For purposes of this subsection, a transfer of title to real property to a legal entity of 
which at least fifty percent (50%) is owned by the land developer, the land 
developer's original entity or the same principals who owned the land developer's 
original entity shall not be considered a conveyance to a third party. For purposes 
of this subsection, the amount of the exemption shall be the difference between the 
market value of the land with site improvements and the market value of the land 
without site improvements as shall be determined by a comparative market analysis 
of a similarly situated parcel or parcels of real property that have not been improved 
with such site improvements contemplated by this subsection. In the case the 
market value of land without site improvements cannot be reasonably assessed 
because of the absence of comparable sales, an exemption value of seventy-five 
percent (75%) of the market value of land with site improvements shall be granted 
1 The statute examined in Reed was not ambiguous; rather, Reed compared the original statute to the 
amended statute, which added a new subsection, LC. § 18-1509A( 4) which stated: "In a prosecution 
under this section, it is not necessary to show that an act described in chapter 15, 61 or 66, title 18, Idaho 
Code, actually occurred." Reed's argument that the statute before amendment must necessarily have 
required proof that an act described had occurred was rejected by the Court due to the plain language of 
Section 19-1509A(l), which specified the elements needed for a conviction. State v. Reed, supra at 123, 
294 PJd 1135. 
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to that parcel. An application is required for the exemption provided in this 
subsection in the first year the exemption is claimed; in subsequent consecutive 
years no new application is required. The application must be made to the board of 
county commissioners by April 15 and the taxpayer and county assessor must be 
notified of any decision and assessment of property by May 15. The decision or 
assessment of property, or both, of the board of county commissioners may be 
appealed to the county board of equalization no later than the fourth Monday in 
June. The applicant shall notify the board of county commissioners in writing of 
any change in eligibility for the parcel by April 15. 
Id., codified as Idaho Code§ 63-602W (2013). 
A federal district court has provided the following analysis with respect to a clarifying 
amendment to a statute: 
To determine whether a particular amendment clarified or changed the law, 
California courts consider whether the prior version of the statute "could not have 
been properly construed" to include the content of the amendment. Carter, 38 
Cal.4th at 924 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 223, 135 P.3d 63 7. The Legislature's declaration of 
what they intended by the prior statute is entitled to consideration, but it is not 
controlling, and simply stating that an amendment "clarified" the prior statute is 
not determinative: 
It is true that if the courts have not yet finally and conclusively 
interpreted a statute and are in the process of doing so, a declaration 
of a later Legislature as to what an earlier Legislature intended is 
entitled to consideration. But even then, a legislative declaration of 
an existing statute's meaning is but a factor for a court to consider 
and is neither binding nor conclusive in construing the statute. This 
is because the Legislature has no authority to interpret a statute. 
That is a judicial task. The Legislature may define the meaning of 
statutory language by a present legislative enactment which, subject 
to constitutional restraints, it may deem retroactive. But it has no 
legislative authority simply to say what it did mean. A declaration 
that a statutory amendment merely clarified the law cannot be given 
an obviously absurd etlect, and the court cannot accept the 
Legislative statement that an unmistakable change in the statute is 
nothing more than a clarification and restatement of its original 
terms. McClung, 34 Cal.4th at 473, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 428, 99 P.3d 
1015 (2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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Jadwin v. County of Kern, 610 F.Supp. 2d 1129, 1146 (E. D. Ca. 2009). Accordingly, the 
Statement of Purpose2 of the 2013 amendments and the Committee Minutes, see R., p. 064, 
which refer to the legislature's intent to "clarify" the 2012 statute are not determinative. 
Furthermore, considering the scope of the 2013 amendments to Idaho Code § 63-602\V( 4), the 
changes cannot be said to be merely clarifying so as to warrant retroactive application. 
B. The 2013 statute expressly states it is retroactive to January 1, 2013. 
The Idaho Legislature expressly made the 2013 statutory amendments retroactive to 
January 1, 2013. 2013 Idaho Sess. Laws 715. The clear intent of the Legislature, then, was that 
the amended statute would apply from January 1, 2013 forward. It logically follows that the 
legislative reasoning behind the 2013 statutory amendments should also only be applied from 
January 1, 2013 forward. Because the amendments were not made retroactive to January 1, 
2012, so as to affect exemption decisions that were made in 2012, the 2013 amendments and 
related legislative reasoning have no bearing on the interpretation of the statute as it existed in 
2012. 
III. 
Idaho Code § 12-117(1) as amended in 2012 allows a court to award attorney's fees, 
including fees on appeal, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a political subdivision 
and a person, if the court finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. In the event that Respondent Ada County Board of Equalization is the prevailing 
party, Respondent seeks an award of costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41. 
Although the statute in question has not previously been interpreted by an appellate 
2 It reads in part: "Section 63-602W(4) is being amended to provide clarification in determining eligibility for this 
exemption by defining land developer, when the real property is no longer eligible for the exemption and provides 
clarification in determining the value of the exemption." 
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court, this appeal was pursued without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Appellant ignores well 
settled law on the authority of a court to rely on an agency regulation construing a statute and on 
the retroactive application of a statutory amendment. Appellant provides no support for its 
argument that the later expiration of an administrative regulation such as Rule 620 is relevant to 
the interpretation of the statute that was previously explained by the rule. The pursuit of the 
appeal was so unreasonable as to justify an award of fees. Compare SEIZConstr., L.L. C. v. 
Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 8, 89 P.3d 848 (2004). 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
By virtue of two separate analyses, the district court correctly held that the exemption 
found in Idaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012) was intended by the Idaho Legislature to be available 
only to the land developer that made the site improvements. The later amendments to the statute 
as well as the legislative reasoning behind the statute are irrelevant and wholly inapplicable to 
the district court's construction of the statute. 
Respondent respectfully requests that the Court uphold the decision of the district court 
that denied the site improvements exemption to Jayo Development, Inc. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 2014. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
/? , --:;;;;-, 
By ~£27_,~ 
( Claire S. Tafcliff 1)7 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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